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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TITANIUM METALS 
CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SPACE METALS, INC., a 
corporation, and VALLEY BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in contract brought by Respondent, 
an out-of-state seller of goods, against Appellant, Valley 
Bank and Trust Company, enforcing payments of amounts 
due and owing under Letters of Credit issued by Appel-
lant Bank. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, tried the case 
without a jury and the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson 
rendered a judgment in favor of the Respondent and 
Case No. 
13474 
1 
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against the Appellant for the sum of fifty-four thousand 
one hundred thirty-two and 72/100 ($54,132.72) dollars 
and costs of Court incurred. 
RELIEF SOUGHT O N APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower Court's 
decision in favor of Respondent and against Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, although not disputing the Statement 
of Facts as set forth in Appellant's brief, does feel that 
Appellant has omitted some very relevant and important 
facts which should be brought to the attention of this 
Court. Respondent further feels that Appellant has mis-
interpreted many of the facts contained in its Statement 
of Facts, and therefore is making a Statement of Facts as 
Respondent finds them. 
Respondent, Titanium Metals Corporation of Amer-
ica, is engaged in the business of selling metal products 
to manufacturing concerns throughout the nation. Its 
business offices are located in New York, New York. Prior 
to May 25, 1968, Titanium was contacted by the Defend-
ant, Space Metals, Inc., a Utah corporation and was asked 
to supply Space Metals, Inc. with substantial quantities of 
titanium fines for use in Space Metals' Utah operation. 
During the early stages of negotiation, Titanium informed 
Space Metals that in order for the requested sales to be 
made on credit, Space Metals must secure from its bank, 
Valley Bank & Trust Company, letters of credit, so that 
2 
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Titanium would be assured of payment for any and all 
goods which would be sold to Space Metals. 
After being approached by Space Metals with this 
request, the Appellant, Valley Bank & Trust Company, 
agreed to comply and sent to Titanium a letter of credit 
(Exhibit 1-P) which stated in part: 
We have approved a fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) 
dollar line of credit for one of our very reliable 
customers, Space Metals, Inc. This line is for the 
specific purpose of covering invoices from your 
company. This letter of guaranty is good until 
August 15, 1968. 
Relying upon this letter, Titanium made numerous 
shipments of titanium fines to Space Metals during the 
period of May 28, 1968 to August 15, 1968. During this 
period, the sales made by Titanium to Space Metals did 
not exceed fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) dollars. As soon 
as the ordered material had been shipped from the Titanium 
plant, an invoice was sent directly to Valley Bank & Trust 
indicating the amount of titanium purchased, the purchase 
price, and the due date of this purchase price. 
Each of the invoices which Titanium mailed to Valley 
Bank contained the following stamped legend in the lower 
left-hand corner: "Please remit to: Titanium Metals 
Corporation of America, P.O. Box 64049, Terminal An-
nex, Los Angeles, California 90054". 
The Appellant, upon receipt of the invoices, utilized 
the following procedure in connection with each letter of 
credit. Upon receipt of the invoices, Valley Bank would 
3 
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immediately prepare an advice, each of which contained a 
description of the invoice and specifically identified it as 
a "sales draft" or "draft". This identification was typed 
directly on the face of the Bank's advice. (Exhibits 5-P 
to 10-P). 
On the due date of the invoices, a Cashier's Check was 
drawn in payment thereof and the invoice was stamped 
"Paid" by Valley Bank & Trust. The check drawn on 
Valley Bank together with the stamped invoice and a pink 
copy of the Bank's advice with the description "We enclose 
in payment our draft (number of cashier's check)" (Em-
phasis added} would then be mailed by Appellant to the 
P. O. Box as directed by the sales draft. (Exhibit 4-P) 
Space Metals, needing additional supplies of the 
titanium fines, induced Valley Bank & Trust Company, 
through its assistant vice-president, to send another letter 
of credit dated October 8, 1968 to Titanium (Exhibit 2-P) 
which stated in part: 
W e have agreed with Mr. Williams of Space 
Metals, Inc. to pay all of your collection drafts 
upon presentation or due date until December 31, 
1968. 
Again Titanium continued to make shipments of the 
metallic material to Space Metals and as each shipment 
was made, sales drafts representing the shipment of titan-
ium fines were sent to Valley Bank & Trust Company. 
Within the due date specified upon each sales draft Titan-
ium would again receive a cashier's check from Valley 
Bank & Trust for the amount of the sales draft together 
with the pink copy of the Bank's advice and the invoice 
4 
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stamped "Paid". The cost of the titanium fines purchased 
during this period was nineteen thousand ($19,000.00) 
dollars. 
Finally on March 3, 1969, Titanium received a third 
and final letter of credit (Exhibit 3-P) from Valley Bank 
& Trust Company which bore a striking resemblance to 
the second letter of credit sent by Valley Bank & Trust 
Company. This third letter stated in part: 
We have agreed with Mr. Williams of Space 
Metals, Inc. to pay all of your collection drafts upon 
presentation or due dates for a period of ninety 
days from the date of this letter. 
Titanium continued its normal practice of making 
shipments to Space Metals without objection by Appel-
lant, simultaneously mailing sales drafts to Valley Bank 
& Trust Company for payment. Titanium submitted to 
Valley Bank & Trust a series of seven (7) sales drafts 
during the period covered by the third letter of credit, 
summarized as follows: 
SALES DRAFT 
(INVOICE) NO. 
69-181 
69-188 
69-199 
69-205 
69-219 
69-223 
69-234 
VALLEY BANK'S 
ADVICE NO. 
1257 
1260 
1311 
1310 
1326 
1325 
1324 
AMOUNT 
1,438.50 
12,261.50 
4,110.00 
9,500.00 
6,850.00 
6,850.00 
4,110.00 
DUE DATE 
4/18/69 
4/27/69 
5/4/69 
5/11/69 
5/24/69 
5/27/69 
6/1/69 
(Exhibits 4-P through 10-P 
Of the above sales drafts, Valley Bank sent a cash-
ier's check for one thousand four hundred thirty-eight and 
50/100 ($1,438.50) dollars accompanied by the first ad-
5 
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vice (1257) to Titanium which bore the following nota-
tion thereon: "We enclose in payment our draft — 
CC006923" and the invoice stamped "Paid". (Exhibit 
4-P) N o notice of nonacceptance, dishonor, or nonpay-
ment of the other six sales drafts was sent by Valley Bank 
to Titanium on or before the due dates, but the remaining 
six advices were finally returned on November 19, 1969 
to Titanium attached to the sales draft originally sent 
with the notation: "We are returning herewith unpaid 
— l l / ^ ^ ^ ^ 
During the entire period covered by the letters of 
credit, the Appellant, pursuant to an agreement with Space 
Metals, and after being notified by receipt of Respondent's 
sales draft that a shipment of titanium fines had been 
made, had perfected its security interest in all of the fines 
shipped to Space Metals. 
The Trial Court in Paragraph 6 of its Findings of 
Fact concluded that the invoices sent to Valley Bank by 
Titanium satisfied the requirements of the letters of credit 
in that Valley Bank waived its requirement for a separate 
draft to be attached to the invoice, 
. . . by its failure to specifically require a draft 
to be sent in the usual form, by issuing and for-
warding its drafts purchased by Space Metals, Inc. 
totaling more than $19,000.00 on a similar letter 
of credit covering an earlier period, by its acknow-
ledgement on the advice that the invoice copies 
with demand to remit payment to the sender were 
"sales drafts", by its failure to return the invoice 
copies upon receipt, or to notify it would not pay 
unless drafts suitable for its banking purposes 
accompanied the invoices, and by its retention of 
6 
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the invoices after the due dates and its failure to 
gi\e notice of nonpayment until more than five 
months after the due date. (R-115) 
At no time did Valley Bank & Trust Company notify 
Titanium that the procedure which it was utilizing in the 
sending of invoices to Valley Bank was improper and 
that such procedure should be remedied or altered to 
conform to a different banking procedure and par-
ticularly that formal commercial drafts should be pre-
sented in order to collect for the shipments. In fact, an 
officer of Valley Bank & Trust on examination by Judge 
Jeppson, admitted that there was absolutely no differ-
ence in the way the Bank handled an invoice as opposed 
to a draft. 
BY THE COURT: 
Q. Mr. Anderson, you have specified your duty 
at the bank where they received an invoice or a 
draft on these letters one and two. What is the 
difference in how you would handle those whether 
it was a draft or an invoice? 
A. Actually, they were handled in the same man-
ner. There's no difference. 
Q. You contacted the customer and told him you 
had it? 
A. Right, as a courtesy we handled them in either 
instance. 
Q. Did you ever write a letter to Titanium Metals 
and advise them that their invoice had been re-
ceived, but since it wasn't a draft you would see 
if your customer wanted to instruct you on what to 
do with it^ or something like that. 
A. No sir. 
7 
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Q. You didn't ever point out to them the differ-
ence. 
A. N o sir. 
Q. In the two that you say exist now? 
A. They are a large company and they have been 
operating under the premise of sending invoices 
in, and as I understand, there was no change on 
their part. However, on Griffs part, he was con-
templating a larger letter of credit and this type 
of thing and he was trying to determine ways of 
raising capital for growth of his company. 
Q. But how did you let this company know, the 
Titanium Company, that your procedure was going 
to be different, that they had to send in an invoice 
if you were to be liable, I mean a draft? 
A. They didn't communicate with us and we 
didn't communicate with them because as far as 
our customer and us we had not resolved anything 
so there was no difference. (R 178 & R 179) 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
WAIVER, I N THE INSTANT ACTION, 
NEED N O T BE SPECIFICALLY PLEAD AND 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT I N 
FINDING T H A T APPELLANT WAIVED 
STRICT COMPLIANCE W I T H THE TERMS 
OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT. 
Appellant has incorrectly taken the position that it 
was Plaintiff's obligation to specifically plead waiver at 
the Trial Court level in order to sustain the findings of 
the Trial Court both as a matter of fact and as a matter 
of law that the Appellant waived strict compliance with 
8 
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the terms of the letter of credit. In support of this position, 
Appellant relies on Rule 8C of The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure entitled "Affirmative Defenses". This rule 
states in part that: 
In pleading to a preceeding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively . . . waiver, and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense. Id. [Emphasis added} 
It is entirely inappropriate for Appellant to rely upon 
this Rule inasmuch as one of the requirements in order 
for the Rule to apply is that there must be a "pleading to 
a preceeding pleading". This is certainly not the case in 
the instant action inasmuch as Respondent (Plaintiff), 
was the party who instituted the action and had no obli-
gation whatsoever to plead to a preceding pleading. The 
Rule is specifically limited to situations involving the 
pleading of waiver as an affirmative defense. Waiver in 
this action is not an affirmative defense but rather merely 
a part of Plaintiff's initial cause of action against the De-
fendant. 
For purposes of clarification it should also be brought 
to the Court's attention that the word "avoidance" carries 
with it substantially the same meaning as "affirmative 
defense". In Mahaiwe Bank v. Douglass, 31 Conn. 175, 
the word, "avoidance" was defined as the allegation or 
statement of new matter, in opposition to a former plead-
ing, which, admitting the facts alleged in such former 
pleadings shows cause why they should not have their 
ordinary legal affect. It is apparent that the terms "affirm-
ative defense" and "avoidance" are synonymous and in no 
9 
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way change application of Rule 8C to situations other than 
those situations which involve the pleading of affirmative 
defenses. 
Appellant cites two cases in support of its position 
that Respondent was required to plead waiver in order to 
prevail in a trial on the merits. The cases upon which 
Appellant relies are not applicable to the issue in question 
inasmuch as both Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Remay, 
58 Idaho 302, 72 P.2d 859 (1937) and Rudd v. Rogerson, 
424 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1967) are cases which involve an 
interpretation of Rule 8C as it applies to the pleading of 
waiver as an affirmative defense. 
The record in this case shows that although neither 
waiver nor estoppel was pleaded by Respondent 
(Defendant)., he relied on both as defenses to the 
charge that he was in default in his payments and 
that he had removed the automobile from Cali-
fornia without written consent. These are special 
defenses and evidence thereof is inadmissable under 
a general denial. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 
supra, at 862. 
As can be easily seen these cases do not fit the facts 
of the instant case. The cases which have ruled on the 
issue of waiver have concluded that there is no obligation 
upon the part of the Plaintiff to specifically plead waiver 
in order to prevail in a trial on the merits. In the case of 
West v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society, 10 Utah 442, 
37 P. 685 (1894) the Plaintiff owned certain property 
which was destroyed by fire and an action was brought 
to recover the value of the property destroyed under an 
insurance policy issued thereon by the Defendant. In 
10 
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deciding the question as to whether or not evidence re-
lated to waiver should have been admitted, the Court 
stated: 
Where a pleading contains an allegation of the 
performance of a condition, it is not absolutely 
necessary to allege a waiver, because proof thereof 
is admissable under the general allegation. 2 May, 
Ins. §589; Insurance Company v. Dougherty, 102 
Pa. St. 568. Id. at 687. 
Similarly, Respondent's pleadings contain general 
allegations regarding the contractual obligations arising 
under the Appellant's letters of credit. Respondent further 
alleged that it fulfilled the condition imposed upon it to 
ship goods and that the Appellant failed to fulfill the 
condition imposed upon it to pay for such goods after they 
had been shipped. Quite clearly then Respondent too 
alleged the performance of conditions in its pleading 
thereby eliminating any need to specifically allege waiver. 
Cases in other jurisdictions have also reached similar 
conclusions with regard to the issue of whether or not a 
Plaintiff has an obligation to specifically plead waiver. In 
Pfaffengut v. Export Ins. Co. of New York et ah 212 
N.W. 518 (N.D. 1927), an action involving two cases, one 
brought by the Plaintiff to recover on an automobile in-
surance policy, and the other to determine the rights of 
the Defendants in and to a certain draft issued to the 
Plaintiff by one of the Defendants in settlement of Plain-
tiff's claim for loss, the Court concluded that the Plain-
tiff had no obligation to raise the question of waiver and 
stated: 
11 
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This brings us to the question of waiver. Defend-
ant first urges that it has pleaded an avoidance of 
the policy in its answers; that Plaintiff failed to 
reply setting up waiver on the part of the Defend-
ant; and so cannot now rely upon waiver. Under 
the circumstances, waiver was not required to be 
pleaded. (Citations). Id. at 520 
On the basis of this case the Appellant is incorrect in 
contending that there was a requirement for Respondent 
to plead waiver before Appellant could be held liable 
under the terms of its letter of credit. 
Appellant is also in error in contending that waiver 
was not plead and therefore the pleadings did not con-
form to the proof offered. The Utah Supreme Court is in 
accord with Respondent's position that where a party 
raises an objection that there is a fatal variance between 
the pleadings and the proof, such objection cannot be 
taken for the first time on appeal. This was the holding in 
the case of Mumjord v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Co., 64 Utah 24, 40, 228 P. 206 (1924). In this case the 
Plaintiff sued Defendant for damages on an indemnity 
bond in which the Union Livestock Commission Company 
of Ogden, Utah was principal and the Defendant therein 
was surety. Plaintiff's Complaint alleged that the drafts 
were drawn on the Livestock Company with its knowledge 
and the Court found that such drafts were drawn with the 
knowledge "and consent" of the Livestock Company. The 
Utah Supreme Court held that the variance between the 
pleadings and the proof did not justify a reversal. 
We have already arrived at a conclusion that the 
facts found by the Court are sustained by the evi-
dence, and while we do not conceed that there is a 
12 
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material variance in view of authorities hereto-
fore referred to, yet, even if the Complaint were 
defective in the respect mentioned, there being 
no objection in the Court below, the defect in this 
Court should be held immaterial and be disregard-
ed. (Citation) Id. a.t 212. 
Respondent, in its Motion for New Trial (R-107) 
made no mention that counsel was taken by surprise in 
that waiver had not been plead, nor was the argument 
even advanced that no opportunity was given to dispute 
the facts proving waiver until the time that this appeal 
was taken. 
From all of the above authorities and holdings it is 
extremely clear that waiver in the instant action need not 
be specifically plead by Respondent and that the Trial 
Court was correct in finding that Appellant waived strict 
compliance with the terms of the letter of credit in issue, 
such finding being based entirely based entirely on the 
evidence presented at trial in support of Respondent's 
position that Appellant was liable under the terms of 
Appellant's letter of credit. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT CLEARLY SUPPORTS ITS 
FINDINGS THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE 
W I T H THE TERMS OF THE LETTER OF 
CREDIT WAS WAIVED BY APPELLANT. 
Appellant maintains that there was no evidence pre-
sented to the trial court to support a finding of waiver. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. The record is 
13 
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replete with statements by bank officials which clearly 
support the lower court's finding that the Bank did in 
fact waive strict compliance with the terms of its letter 
of credit in issue. 
Appellant cites in its brief the case of Phoenix Ins. 
Company v. Heath et al, 90 Utah 87, 61 P.2d 308 (1936). 
This case involved a Plaintiff insurance company who had 
instructed its agents, later to be named Defendants, to 
reduce the amount of an insurance policy which Plaintiff 
had issued upon a certain building. Upon receipt of this 
definite instruction to cancel promptly, the Defendant 
agents wrote to the Plaintiff insurance company and asked 
it to reconsider the reduction. The Plaintiff immediately 
responded by letter and affirmed its original directive. 
Just prior to the time that Plaintiff's letter was received 
by Defendants, the insured building was destroyed. The 
Plaintiffs insurance company sued the Defendants for the 
difference between the amount it was required to pay to 
the insured and the amount it would have been required 
to pay had the Defendants followed the directives con-
tained in Plaintiff's letters. The Defendants contended 
that Plaintiff's action constituted a waiver of its demand 
to reduce the policy. The Court found in this case that 
no waiver was proven because there was no proof offered 
to show that it was Plaintiff's intention to reconsider their 
original order. The Court in finding for the Plaintiff 
found, 1) that the agents did not promptly request recon-
sideration; 2) that the company did not reconsider or re-
eximine the matter; 3) that the company did not delay in 
making its reply to the agents and 4) that the company 
immediately reaffirmed its request for cancellation. 
14 
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The facts of the above case upon which Appellant 
heavily relies, are very different from the facts of the case 
involving Valley Bank & Trust. Moreover, Appellant 
has omitted an important part of the definition which is 
extremely relevant to the issue of whether or not suffic-
ient evidence was presented to support a finding of waiver. 
What the Court in fact stated was: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. (Citation) To constitute a waiver, 
there must be an existing right, benefit, or ad-
vantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an in-
tention to relinquish it. It must be distinctly made, 
although it may be express or implied. (Citations) 
Id!, at 312. (Emphasis added} 
It should be noted that the Court in this case not only 
defines waiver but also states that waiver may be express, 
or implied from the conduct of the party against whom a 
waiver is being asserted. The instant action involves 
three (3) letters of credit and a failure to pay or honor 
obligations under the third and final letter of credit by 
the Appellant. The period of time covered by these three 
letters of credit ran from May 28, 1968 to June of 1969, 
a period of more than one full year during which time Re-
spondent continuously relied upon Appellant's guarantee 
of the credit of Space Metals. During that lengthy period 
of time, Defendant Valley Bank & Trust took no affirma-
tive action whatsoever to inform Respondent that any of 
the procedures being utilized was incorrect. There is a 
total absence of any statement in the record made by any 
bank official indicating that the bank intended a change 
of procedure on the part of Titanium, its agents and/or 
representatives. 
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In Phoenix supra, the insurance company attempted 
immediate action to definitely define its position and in-
form its agents that it did in fact require compliance with 
its original directive. In the instant case, Valley Bank & 
Trust never, during the entire period in question, defined 
its position, expressed any discontent over the procedure 
which was being used by Titanium in informing Valley 
Bank & Trust of the amounts due and owing by Space 
Metals and never requested Titanium to conduct itself 
differently. 
Respondent does not disagree with the statement of 
the law in Phoenix but Respondent does definitely wish 
to bring to the Court's attention that the facts in Phoenix 
are so different from the facts of the case in question that 
this case only gives the Court an indication as to what 
activity does not amount to a waiver. 
A waiver may be express or implied, it may be 
established by an express statement or agreement, 
or by acts or conduct from which an intention to 
waive may reasonably be inferred . . . An implied 
waiver may arise where a person has pursued such 
a course of conduct as to evidence an intention to 
waive a right or where his conduct is inconsistent 
with any other intention than to waive it. Waiver 
may be inferred from conduct or acts putting one 
off his gard and leading him to believe that a right 
has been waived. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and 
Waiver §160. [Emphasis added) 
In the case of Reynolds v. Travelers Ins. Co., 176 
Wash. 36, 28 P.2d 310, 314 (1934) an action was brought 
to recover the full amount of a life insurance policy made 
payable at the death of the insured name therein. The 
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Court, in concluding that the Appellant insurance com-
pany had waived strict compliance with the terms of the 
policy regarding notice, treated the question of "implied 
waiver'' by stating that: 
An implied waiver may arise where one party has 
pursued such a course of conduct as to evidence an 
intention to waive a right or where his conduct 
is inconsistent with any other intention than to 
waive it . . . A waiver is unilateral and arises by 
the intentional relinquishment of a right, or by 
neglect to insist upon it ....... (Citations) Id. at 314 
{Emphasis added} 
Clearly, in the present case, the trial court looked at 
the conduct of the Appellant as evidenced by the record 
and determined that the evidence with which it was pre-
sented was sufficient to support both a finding of fact and 
a conclusion of law that Appellant Bank, Valley Bank 
& Trust had waived strict compliance with the terms of its 
letter of credit. 
In the Findings of Fact, Paragraph 6, the Court did 
not generalize but specifically enumerated the acts of 
Valley Bank's offices which supported the general find-
ings and the conclusions of law. These specifics are sup-
ported in the record by the following testimony. The trial 
court specifically found that Appellant had waived the 
necessity for a separate draft by "its failure to specifically 
require drafts to be sent in the usual form". (R 170 & 
R 171) 
The bank officer further testified that at no time was 
Titanium ever advised that the procedure which it was 
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following was incorrect or not in accord with the normal 
banking procedures utilized by Valley Bank & Trust. 
(R 178 & R 179) 
The Court further concluded that Valley Bank had 
waived strict compliance by "issuing and forwarding its 
drafts purchased by Space Metals totaling more than 
$19,000.00 on a similar letter of credit covering an earlier 
period, as evidenced by the first invoice shipment covered 
by the letter of credit". (R. 144) {Emphasis added] 
Similarly the Court also concluded that Valley Bank 
waived strict compliance "by its acknowledgement on the 
advice that the invoice copies with the demand to remit 
payment to the center were 'sales drafs' ". (R 142) In 
further support of this finding, the record contains testi-
mony from an officer of Appellant Bank that the Bank 
identified the invoice as a sales draft. (R170, 171, 172, 
139 & 140) 
And finally the trial court concluded that Appellant 
had waived strict compliance by its failure to return the 
invoice copies upon receipt or to notify it would not pay 
unless drafts suitable for its banking purposes accom-
panied the invoices and by its retention of the invoices 
after the due dates and its failure to give notice of non-
payment until more than five months after the due date. 
(R142, 193 & 194) 
The record clearly shows that there was more than 
substantial evidence upon which the trial court relied in 
entering its finding that Appellant had waived strict com-
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pliance with the terms of the leter of credit. The conduct 
entered into by Appellant amounted to an implied waiver 
as defined in Reynolds, supra. Respondent relied on the 
conduct of Appellant and Appellant must be held re-
sponsible for its failure to insist upon strict compliance 
with the terms of its letter of credit, and by reason of such 
conduct has waived any separate right to be relieved of 
liability because separate formal commercial drafts were 
not sent separately with the sales invoices. 
POINT III 
THE ISSUER OF A LETTER OF CREDIT 
MAY WAIVE STRICT COMPLIANCE W I T H 
THE TERMS THEREOF AND IS THEREBY 
ESTOPPED FROM LATER CLAIMING EX-
EMPTION FROM LIABILITY. 
Article Five of The Uniform Commercial Code en-
titled "Letters of Credit", has been adopted in Utah and 
is found in §70A-5-101 et seq. of the Utah Code Ann. 
(1953). These statutes should be utilized by the Court 
in assessing the merits of Defendant's appeal, and Re-
spondent would particularly like to call the Court's atten-
tion to the basic definitional sections of that chapter and 
also to the official comments made on those particular 
sections by the drafters of The Uniform Commercial Code. 
Section 70A-5-102 states that: 
(1) This chapter applies 
(a) to a credit issued by a bank if the credit 
requires a documentary draft or a documen-
tary demand for payment; and . . . 
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(c) to a credit issued by a bank or other 
person if the credit is not within subpara-
graphs (a) or (b) but conspicuously states that 
it is a letter of credit or is conspicuously so 
entitled . . . 
(3) This article deals with some but not all of 
the rules and concepts of letters of credit as such 
rules or concepts have developed prior to this act 
or may hereafter develop. The fact that this chap-
ter states a rule does not by itself require, imply 
or negate application of the same or a converse 
rule to the situation not provided for or to a person 
not specified by this article. Id. 
The official comments to paragraph (1) (a) particu-
larly state that: 
Paragraph (1) (a) is applicable to banks and states 
whenever the promise to honor is conditioned on 
presentation of any piece of paper, the transaction 
is within this article . . . Id. 
In commenting on subsection (3), the drafters of the 
law realized that the concept of letters of credit is still 
growing and in many instances unexplored. I t was their 
intention to leave the application of Chapter Five dealing 
with letters of credit very broad in scope and allow the 
Courts to look into the facts surrounding each individual 
transaction and then apply the law in existence at the time 
of is decision. 
Subsection (3) recognizes that in the present state 
of the law and variety of practices as to letters of 
credit, no statute can effectively or wisely codify 
all the possible letters of credit without stiltifying 
further development of this useful financing de-
vice. The more important areas not covered by this 
article revolve around the question of when docu-
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ments in fact and in law do or do not comply with 
the terms of the credit. In addition, such minor 
matters as the absence of expiration dates and the 
effect of extending shipment but not expiration 
dates are also left untouched for future adjudica-
tion. The rules embodied in this article can be 
viewed as those expressing the fundamental theor-
ies underlying letters of credit. For this reason, 
the second sentence of subsection (3) makes ex-
plicit the Court's power to apply a particular rule 
by analogy in cases not within its terms, or to re-
frain from doing so. Under §1-102 such applica-
tion is to follow the cannon of liberal interpreta-
tion to promote underlying purposes and policies. 
Since the law of letters of credit is still developing, 
conscious use of that cannon and attention to 
fundamental theory by the Court are particularly 
appropriate. Id. {Emphasis added} 
In defining a letter of credit, section 70A-5-103 Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) states that: 
(1) In this article unless the context otherwise 
requires, 
(a) "credit" or "letter of credit" means an 
engagement by a bank or other person made 
at the request of a customer and of a kind 
within the scope of this article (§5-102) that 
the issuer will honor drafts or other demands 
for payment upon compliance with the condi-
tions specified in the credit. A credit may be 
either revokable or irrevokable. The engage-
ment may be either an agreement to honor 
or a statement that the bank or other person 
is authorized to honor. 
(b) A "documentary draft" or a "documen-
tary demand for payment" is one honor of 
which is conditioned upon the presentation 
of a document or documents. "Document" 
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means any paper including document of title, 
security, invoice, certificate, notice of default 
and the like . . . Id. {Emphasis added] 
As can be easily seen from the above-cited statutes 
it was the intention of the framers of the law to draft a 
statute involving letters of credit which would be broad 
enough to encompass the developing commercial con-
cepts to which letters of credit are applicable. In order to 
do this, the statutory language was intentionally kept ex-
tremely broad and the Courts were assigned the task of 
interpreting such, and were given great discretionary 
power to determine whether or not the transaction fell 
within the terms of Chapter Five of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The only caveat or restriction placed upon 
the interpreting Court is that its decisions should be in 
accord with the fundamental theory and underlying pur-
poses and policies of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
namely, promotion of easy, uncomplicated, and economi-
cally beneficial commercial transactions. 
With the above statutory directives kept in mind, 
this Court must decide whether or not Appellant did, in 
fact, through its normal banking procedures, waive strict 
compliance with the terms of its letters of credit issued 
on March 3, 1969. Respondent would refer the Court to 
the case of Consolidated Sales Co,, Inc. v. Bank of Hamp-
ton Roads, 193 Va. 307. 68 S.E.2d 652 (1952), a case 
which is almost an exact duplicate of the case at bar. In 
this action, the Consolidated Sales Company, Inc. sued the 
Bank of Hampton Roads to recover the amount for which 
Defendant sold certain electrical appliances to a retail 
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dealer on Defendant's credit. Recovery of the sums sued 
for was denied by the trial court and Plaintiff appealed. 
From the facts of the case it was found, that the 
Defendant bank had issued to the Plaintiff a letter of credit 
guaranteeing the payment for goods purchased on open 
account by one of the bank's customers. Upon the sub-
mission by the Plaintiff to the bank of drafts accompanied 
by invoices representing the goods which should be 
shipped, the bank promised remittance upon receipt of 
that documentation. 
Plaintiff began to make sales to the bank's customer 
and attached the requested draft to each of the first seven 
(7) invoices submitted to the bank for payment. There-
after, an additional eighteen to twenty shipments were 
made by the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff received payment 
for such by the bank upon the mere submission of invoices 
alone. In treating the question of waiver by the bank of 
strict compliance, the Court agreed with the trial court 
which had held that the Bank, by its conduct had waived 
strict compliance with the terms of the letters of credit. 
It definitely appears that on all of the numerous 
shipments made subsequent to the first seven, no 
draft was sent with the invoices. The trial court 
held that by continuing to make payment upon 
receipt of the invoices alone, the hank had waived 
the provision in the letter which specified and 
had theretofore required that a draft accompany 
each invoice. With that conclusion we agree. Id. 
at 656 [Emphasis added] 
The record is filled with references made by bank 
officers to the fact that the bank itself had on each occasion 
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typed an advice which described the invoice as a draft. If 
this alone is not sufficient to sustain the finding of the 
trial court, then the Court's decision in Consolidated Sales 
Company, supra, should be. Appellant had, for the period 
of over one year, induced Respondent, by its letters of 
credit, to make shipments to Space Metals, Inc. On all 
occasions, Respondent submitted to Appellant invoices 
which were described by Appellant itself as "sales drafts''. 
Appellant even went so far as to pay the first sales draft 
which it received under the third letter of credit. (Ex-
hibit 4-P) As set out in the Statement of Facts, Appellant 
then belatedly returned the remaining six sales drafts 
(Invoices) unpaid. 
The question of the necessity of an accompanying 
draft was also treated in the case of Richard v. Royal Bank 
of Canada, 23 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1928). In this case, the 
Plaintiffs agreed to pay the bank, the issuer of the letters 
of credit, any amounts that they had paid out, if payments 
were made under the conditions embodied in the letters 
of credit, and, if the conditions had been strictly adhered 
to. The letters of credit provided that the shipments must 
be completed and the drafts drawn on certain dates. The 
drafts were to be accompanied by certain documents. The 
bank, upon receipt of the documents, made payments 
although no drafts were presented to Plaintiff. Judge 
Agustus N . Hand affirmed the trial court's decision and 
stated that: 
The letters of credit did not require the drawing 
of drafts. They assumed that they would be drawn, 
but, had they been drawn by a seller of iron, the 
Defendants, who were financing Fogle in his pur-
chases, could not have sued the drawers thereof. 
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To be sure, the drafts would have served as vouch-
ers, but the receipts furnished were as good. Like-
wise, as the weight certificates, the weight is given 
on the invoices, and approved by the person desig-
nated to approve the weight certificates. No possi-
ble purpose could be served by having separate 
documents, although such appeared to be more 
customary. Id. at 433. 
It is clear from the above-cited authorities that Appel-
lant, by reason of its very definite conduct, had voluntarily 
changed its position and had waived any requirement of 
strict compliance under the terms of its letter of credit. 
In so doing, the Appellant cannot now come to this Court 
and assert that it had been wronged by reason of Re-
spondent's alleged failure to comply with banking pro-
cedures which Appellant, for over a period of one year, 
never felt important enough to enforce or even discuss 
with Respondent. Consolidated Sales Co., supra, and Rich-
ards, supra, both stand for the proposition that technical 
objections raised by the issuer of a letter of credit will not 
be sufficient to justify a conclusion that the issuer should 
not be held responsible for payments guaranteed by rea-
son of its own letters of credit. 
POINT IV 
A LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL BE CON-
STRUED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
T O THE RECIPIENT THEREOF AND IN 
CASES OF AMBIGUITY THE AMBIGUITY 
SHALL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE 
RECIPIENT. 
It has been consistently the practice of the courts, 
when faced with the interpretation of a letter of credit, 
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to interpret such letter in a light most favorable to the 
recipient. In the case of Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1917) the trial court 
granted a Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of 
the confirming bank and denied a similar motion made 
by the beneficiary of a letter of credit. In finding that the 
beneficiary had in fact complied with the terms of the 
letter of credit, the Court gave a concise and accurate 
summary of the principles of interpretation that should 
be utilized when attempting to construe a letter of credit. 
A construction that will sustain an instrument will 
be preferred to one that will defeat it; (Citations) 
If an agreement is fairly capable of a construction 
that will make it valid and enforceable, that con-
struction will be given it. (Citations) The same 
general principles which apply to other contracts 
in writing govern letters of credit. (Citations) 
Where a letter of credit is fairly susceptible of two 
constructions, one of which makes it fair, custo-
mary, and one which prudent men would naturally 
enter into, while the other makes it inequitable, 
the former interpretation must be preferred to the 
latter, and a construction rendering the contract 
possible of performance will be preferred to one 
which renders its performance impossible or mean-
ingless. (Citations) Moreover, as between the bene-
ficiary of the letter of credit and the issuer, if ambi-
guity exists, the words are taken as strongly against 
the issuer as a reasonable pleading will justify. Id. 
at 465, 466. 
Clearly then in the instant case, even if Appellant 
were to assert ambiguity or error in the letter of credit, 
this Court should construe that letter of credit in favor 
of the beneficiary as opposed to the issuer so that the 
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basic commercial principles underlying letters of credit 
will not be disrupted. 
A similar result was reached in the case of Bank of 
America National Trust and Savings Assn. v. Liberty 
Bank & Trust, 116 F.Supp. 233 (D.C. Okla. 1953). In 
establishing rules of interpretation and construction for 
letters of credit the Court stated: 
Although there is a line of authority which could 
be interpreted to require that each "t" be crossed 
and " i " be dotted by any and all banks dealing 
with letters of credit and drafts negotiated there-
under, such an interpretation of this line of author-
ity is improper. Certain practical considerations 
must be taken into account in determining whether 
the terms of the letter of credit have in fact been 
met. 
This Court frowns upon mere technical defenses 
where in essence the contractual understanding be-
tween the parties has been met. Id. at 236. 
Michie on Banks and Banking, Vol. p. 372, is in 
agreement with the holding in both Venizelos S.A., supra, 
and Bank of America, supra. 
In determining the conditions of a bill of credit, 
the ordinary rules governing this construction and 
interpretation of writings, and especially com-
mercial contracts are applied. This is a construc-
tion of a letter of credit as to the conditions preced-
ent to payment of drafts is governed by rules ap-
plicable in ordinary commercial contracts. Accord-
ingly, the bank's writings respecting a letter of 
credit must be construed most strongly against it, 
and must be construed so as to be reasonable and 
consistent with an honest intent. . . . letters of 
credit do not usually contain a direct promise to 
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pay; but such promise is implied or inferred from 
the statement that the credit has been established 
and is irrevokable. Id. {Emphasis added} 
As is clearly pointed out from the above authorities, 
even if it were to be conceeded, that there was an ambi-
guity in, or failure to comply with, the letter of credit in 
issue, that ambiguity, and/or noncompliance must neces-
sarily be construed in favor of the Respondent. To do 
otherwise would have the untenable effect of unnec-
essarily and improperly restricting common commercial 
practices and would cause many out-of-state extenders 
of credit to refrain from extending such credit because 
of fear that an accidental failure to comply with one of the 
mere technicalities of the letter of credit would result in 
the issuer's escaping liability and thereby place the en-
tire financial burden and loss upon the out-of-state ex-
tender of credit. Such a result is not only undesirable but 
highly improper. 
It is Appellant's contention that there was not strict 
compliance with the terms of the letters of credit. Re-
spondent, while rebutting the arguments raised by Appel-
lant, has demonstrated that there was in fact strict compli-
ance with the terms of the letters of credit, based upon 
the Appellant's employee's own admissions that the docu-
ments which were received under terms of the letter of 
credit were considered as and identified by the bank's 
employees as "sales drafts" or "drafts" and were paid as 
such without objection by the bank. The record makes it 
perfectly clear that Appellant and Respondent, by reason 
of their continuous and unchanged course of conduct, 
had agreed and consented to the procedure that the in-
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voices which Respondent submitted were sufficient to 
qualify as drafts under each of Appellant's letters of 
credit. The testimony given to the trial court and the ex-
hibits offered and received support the conclusion that the 
parties had agreed to a course of conduct which the Ap-
pellant now asserts was improper. Appellant should not 
be allowed to alter the terms of an agreement which it 
voluntarily entered into and which later proved not to be 
in its best economic interests. Therefore, Appellant's 
argument in Point III of its brief regarding strict con-
struction of letters of credit is moot, such mootness arising 
by reason of Appellant's own admission and own practices 
which necessarily qualify the invoices (sales drafts) as 
drafts under the terms of its letters of credit. Appellant, 
by and through its officers, admitted in the record that the 
bank's procedure in handling invoices and drafts was en-
tirely the same in that the bank, upon receipt of invoices, 
processed such just as it would process a draft which had 
been received. The Appellant should not be allowed to 
escape liability by raising a technicality and particularly 
one which had never been brought to Respondent's atten-
tion during the entire period of Respondent's relationship 
with Appellant. 
POINT V 
THERE IS A PRESUMPTION THAT THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
CORRECT AND EVERY REASONABLE IN-
TEND ANT MUST BE INDULGED IN FAVOR 
OF IT. 
The trial court in its Findings of Fact concluded that 
the Appellant had, by its actions for over a period of one 
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year, waived strict compliance with the terms of the 
letters of credit which it had isued. Appellant now asks 
this Court to review the findings of the trial court and 
claims those findings to be in error. It has consistently 
been the practice of the Utah Supreme Court to review 
with careful scrutiny the claim by any Appellant that the 
trial court's decision was in error. 
In the case of McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 
241 P.2d 468 (1952) the Plaintiff brought an action 
against the Defendant to recover under implied contract 
for services rendered and expenses incurred by the Plain-
tiff in securing bidders on and buyers of machinery and 
equipment sold for the benefit of Defendant at a sheriff's 
sale. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the findings and that there was an 
implied contract to pay for reasonable value of Plaintiff's 
services. In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the 
Court stated that: 
The Plaintiff having prevailed, is entitled to the 
benefit of the evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to him, together with every inference 
and intendment fairly and reasonably arising there-
from. Id. at 469. 
The case of Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 
277 (1952), summarizes the test followed by the Court: 
Hence, if there is any competent evidence in the 
record to support the Court's findings the judg-
ment should not be disturbed. (Citations) This 
principle is well stated in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 
Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070, 1072: 
As this is a law action, the question is not 
whether the evidence would have sup-
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ported the decision in favor of Appel-
lants, but whether the decision made by 
the trial court finds support in the evi-
dence. If there is competent, credible 
evidence to support the findings made by 
the trial court, then those findings should 
stand. Id. at 279. 
A careful review of the record before this Court re-
veals a substantial amount of evidence in support of the 
trial court's decision. It is the Appellant's burden to show 
that the judgment of the trial court was incorrect and the 
Appellant must overcome a presumption that the judg-
ment of the trial court was correct and the burden of 
affirmatively showing error is on the party complaining 
thereof. (See Burton v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514 (1952). 
Appellant has not met this burden; it has only made 
broad, all encompassing statements claiming that the 
evidence presented to the trial court did not support the 
trial court's findings and then arguing the trial court in-
correctly aplied the law to the facts. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S USE OF THE 
WORD "WAIVER" TO DESCRIBE APPEL-
LANTS CONDUCT WAS CORRECT AND 
APPELLANT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
REBUT ALL OF SUCH EVIDENCE OF CON-
DUCT AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
In response to Appellant's argument that the Court 
erred in considering and deciding the case on a theory 
which was not plead nor revealed to the parties until 
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after the conclusion of the trial, it has been shown that 
Respondent, in fact, had no duty to plead waiver as Appel-
lant has claimed. Appellant is further incorrect in his 
statement that there was no evidence offered on waiver. 
The record is filled with evidence that Appellant's con-
duct as it applied to each of the letters of credit which it 
had issued. It becomes quite clear upon a reading of the 
record including the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law that the trial court used the term "waiver" to de-
scribe the sum total of Appellant's conduct which justified 
the attaching of liability to Appellant. The issue of waiver 
was also raised in Respondent's trial memorandum which 
was submitted to the Court. Appellant, at this time, had an 
opportunity to submit a reply memorandum to rebut Re-
spondent's argument that Valley Bank & Trust was liable 
under its letter of credit. Appellant had every opportunity 
to submit evidence which would show that it did in fact 
require strict compliance. Either that evidence does not 
in fact exist or if it does, Appellant failed to introduce it 
at the time of trial. Respondent, on the other hand, as 
the record will reveal showed through the testimony of 
bank officials that Appellant did not require strict com-
pliance with the terms of the letter of credit. 
For purposes of argument, even if it is assumed that 
the trial court was in error in not informing the parties 
that it would be relying on the theory of waiver to decide 
the case, Appellant's argument is still doomed to failure. 
In the case of Tree v. White, et al, 110 Utah 233, 171 P.2d 
398 (1946), the Utah Supreme Court sets out to test as to 
what would amount to a reversable error. 
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We direct our attention to the cross assignments 
of error urged by plaintiff, for the reason that if 
the trial court made erroneous findings we will not 
reverse the judgment if the findings which should 
have been made would support the judgment 
entered. 
A decision right in result will not be re-
versed even though the reason stated for 
it is wrong. (Citations) 
The Appellant may not prevail unless there has 
been an error in the result as well as error in the 
reasoning. Dayton Power & Light Company v. 
Public Utilities Comm., 292 U.S. 290, 54 S.ct. 647, 
652, 78L. ed. 1267. Id. at 399. 
Applying this test to the case at bar, it becomes clear 
that if we assume that the trial court based its findings 
on the wrong reason, i.e. "waiver", the record clearly 
reveals that Respondent was in fact entitled to judgment 
in its favor by reason of Appellant's conduct, whether 
that be labeled as "waiver" or an actual admission, to-
gether with the bank's advices which confirm Respond-
ent's position that invoices were sales drafts which com-
plied with the letter of credit. 
In conclusion, for purposes of argument, it would 
appear that the result which the trial court reached was 
entirely correct and it is inconsequential whether the 
reasoning utilized by the trial court in reaching that re-
sult was proper or improper. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the authorities cited by Appellant 
and the facts of the instant action that the trial court was 
correct in entering judgment for the Plaintiff Titanium 
Metals Corporation. Titanium had relied upon three 
letters of credit issued by Respondent to insure payment 
for goods which Titanium sold to Space Metals. Appel-
lant, during the entire transaction took a security interest 
in all of the titanium fines sold to Space Metals by Titan-
ium to protect its interests in the transaction. Appellant's 
claim that Titanium should not recover because it did not 
follow normal banking procedures is incorrect inasmuch 
as Titanium followed a procedure which Valley Bank 
assented to and accepted without objection. Valley Bank 
even paid with its own drafts all invoices submitted under 
the first two letters of credit and the first purchase under 
the third letter of credit. Valley Bank cannot now assert 
that it is not liable to Titanium for the price of the goods 
purchased by Space Metals under its third letter of credit. 
The authorities cited in Respondent's brief support 
the principle that waiver, in the instant action need not 
be specifically plead by Respondent. The trial court was 
correct in finding that Appellant waived strict compli-
ance with the terms of the letter of credit in issue, such 
finding being based entirely on the evidence presented at 
the trial in support of Respondent's position that Appel-
lant was liable under the terms of Appellant's letter of 
credit. Appellant must be held responsible for its failure 
to insist upon strict compliance with the terms of this 
letter of credit and by reason of such conduct has waived 
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any right to be relieved of liability because separate for-
mal commercial drafts did not accompany the sales in-
voices. Technical objections raised by the issuer of the letter 
of credit will not be sufficient to justify a conclusion that 
the issuer should not be held responsible for payment 
guaranteed by reason of its own letters of credit, the terms 
of which were satisfied. 
Even though it is Respondent's position that there 
was strict compliance with the terms of the letters of 
credit, as agreed upon by the parties, Appellant should 
still not now be allowed to recover claiming ambiguity in 
the terms of the third letter of credit because if in fact 
there was ambiguity, that ambiguity should be resolved 
in favor of Respondent, the beneficiary of the letter of 
credit. 
There is also a presumption that the judgment of the 
trial court was correct and every reasonable intendment 
must be indulged in favor of it. It is the Appellant's 
burden to show that the judgment of the trial court was 
incorrect and the burden of affirmatively showing error 
is on the Appellant. It has not met this burden and the 
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
The trial court's use of the word "waiver" to describe 
Appellant's conduct was correct and Appellant had an 
opportunity to rebut all of such evidence of conduct at 
the time of trial or on motion at the conclusion of the 
trial. Appellant failed to do so. Even if it is assumed that 
the trial court based its findings on the wrong reason, the 
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record clearly reveals that the Respondent was in fact 
entitled to judgment in its favor by reason of Appellant's 
conduct during the period in question. A decision right in 
result will not be reversed. 
From all of the above, we submit that the trial court 
was correct in finding for Respondent and its judgment 
should be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON 
ALVIN I. SMITH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
1305 J. C. Penney Building 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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